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CALVIN, PLANTING A, AND THE NATURAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: A RESPONSE 
TO BEVERSLUIS 
Michael Czapkay Sudduth 
In this paper I present a critical response to several claims made by John 
Beversluis on the closely allied topics of natural knowledge of God and the 
noetic effects of sin in relation to the work of John Calvin and Alvin Plantinga. 
I challenge Beversluis' claim that Plantinga has misconstrued Calvin's position 
on the sensus divinitatis and that he has weakened Calvin's doctrine of the noet-
ic effects of sin. Moreover, I develop a coherent case for the sense in which 
Calvin maintains that fallen humans do and do not have a natural knowledge of 
God. My conclusion rebuts Beversluis' claim that Calvin denies any natural 
knowledge of God for fallen human persons and defends Plantinga's philo-
sophical account of Calvin's sensus divinitatis. 
In the 1930s Karl Barth and Emil Brunner debated whether and to what 
extent human persons have a natural knowledge of God, especially as 
this question arises in the context of John Calvin's discussion of the 
knowledge of God in his Institutes of the Christian Religion. Barth is well 
known for his rejection of natural theology on the grounds that there is 
no knowledge of God, even as creator, apart from a knowledge of God 
as redeemer. Barth's slogan, finitum non capax infiniti est, expressed his 
fundamental conviction that God can only be known when He reveals 
Himself and the noetic effects of sin entail that grace is a necessary pre-
condition for all knowledge of God. 
In his challenging article "Reforming the 'Reformed' Objection to 
Natural Theology," (Faith and Philosophy 12, April 1995)' John Beversluis 
has resurrected the closely related topics of the natural knowledge of 
God and the noetic effects of sin in the context of contemporary philoso-
phy of religion. His focus is the religious epistemology of Alvin 
Plantinga. Beversluis contends that Plantinga has misconstrued Calvin's 
doctrine of the sensus divinitatis (sense of divinity) and as a result has 
substantially weakened Calvin's account of the noetic effects of sin. 
Beversluis maintains that Calvin, unlike Plantinga, is a fideist. Calvin, he 
claims, explicitly denies any natural knowledge of God for fallen human 
persons. It is my contention that it is Beversluis who has misconstrued 
Calvin's position on the natural knowledge of God, and as a result his 
critique of Plantinga is significantly defective. 
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1. Plantinga, the Sensus Divinitatis, and the Noetic Effects of Sin 
Beversluis' first argument aims at showing that Plantinga has misunder-
stood Calvin's treatment of the sensus divinitatis in the opening chapters of the 
Institutes. Consequently, Plantinga's account of what fallen human persons are 
able to know by the deliverances of reason radically minimizes the noetic 
effects of sin and is incompatible with Calvin's account of natural knowledge 
of God. Beversluis begins by pointing out Plantinga's well- known interpreta-
tion of the opening chapters of Book I of the Institutes of the Christian Religion: 
Calvin believes that there is within the human mind an innate disposition to 
form belief in God in a broad range of widely realized experiential circum-
stances. Plantinga identifies this theistic belief-forming mechanism with what 
Calvin calls the sensus divinitatis, and it is triggered by the kinds of circum-
stances discussed by Calvin in chapter 5 of Book 1 of the Institutes (e.g., sight 
of the starry night sky).2 In these circumstances people do often form beliefs 
like God has created all this, God is present, etc. Plantinga maintains that this ten-
dency to fonn beliefs in God has been adversely affected by sin so that people 
do not always form theistic beliefs with the natural spontaneity they were 
designed to (and possibly fail to form belief in God at all in some instances).) 
Nonetheless, there still exists an actual natural knowledge of God for many 
fallen human persons. 
Beversluis claims that Plantinga has taken Calvin's discussion of the sensus 
divinitatis out of context. Whereas Plantinga understands Calvin's references 
to a functioning sensus divinitatis (in the Institutes 1:1-5) to refer to humans in 
their fallen state, Beversluis maintains that Calvin's discussion of the natural 
knowledge of God in these chapters is confined to a consideration of man's 
pre-fallen (or pre-Iapsarian) state and so, being inapplicable to the epistemic 
capacities of fallen (or post-Iapsarian) humans, is irrelevant to giving an 
account of the human epistemic situation with reference to belief in God. 
According to Beversluis, the fundamental thesis of the opening chapters of 
Book I of the Institutes is that "fallen human beings lack both the direct and 
immediate knowledge of God with which they were created and the capacity 
to achieve it" (RRO, p. 193). The sensus divinitatis is not merely "suppressed" 
by sin, but it is extinguished by sin (RRO, pp. 193-94). As a result, the sensus 
divinitatis "with which human beings were originally created is no longer 
operative in fallen humanity" (RRO, p. 193). Although there remains an objec-
tively clear revelation of God (as Creator) in nature, it is subjectively obscured 
by sin. In fact, the revelation of God as Creator is not seen at all. Beversluis 
contrasts Plantinga's interpretation of Calvin with his own: Calvin "unam-
biguously asserts that, in their present fallen condition, human beings have no 
eyes to discern the revelation of God in Nature" (lillO, p. 194). 
After quoting Calvin (Institutes 1.5.15) to the effect that post-Iapsarian 
humans are by nature unable to attain "the pure and clear knowledge of 
God" he continues .... 
Not only does Calvin not say what Plantinga claims he says; he 
explicitly denies it. According to Calvin, it is emphatically not the 
case that there is in fallen human beings "a disposition to believe 
propositions of the sort this flower was created by God or this vast 
intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the 
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flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches 
of the universe" (R&BG, 80) .... 
Hence in spite of the universally present but epistemically ineffica-
cious revelation of God in nature and in spite of the ineradicable but 
epistemically blinded sensus divinitatis in human nature, the pre-fall-
en "innate tendency, or nisus, or disposition" to believe in God with 
[which] human beings were originally created is now "suppressed" 
and "smothered" by ignorance and wickedness. (RRO, p. 195) 
Beversluis then gives what he takes to be Calvin's account of how fallen 
human beings can and do attain knowledge of God. What is needed is the 
revelation of God in the Scriptures, as well as an internal work of grace in 
the heart. The natural revelation of God in creation cannot be perceived 
without faith. Without the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit fallen 
humans "are not capable - much less, innately disposed - to form the belief 
that God exists upon contemplating the beauty or the grandeur of Nature" 
(RRO, p. 196). In their fallen state humans "can believe in God only so far 
as the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit enables them to do so." (RRO, 
p. 197). The point is reiterated in his striking conclusion: "He [Calvin] is a 
fideist through and through - a theologian who believes that, so far as fall-
en human beings are concerned, knowledge of God is the result of the 
internal illumination of the Holy Spirit and hence a gift to God's elect" 
(RRO, p. 200).4 
It seems then that Beversluis is setting up the following distinction 
between Plantinga and Calvin. 
Plantinga maintains: 
[PI] Human persons were originally created with a sensus divinitatis 
which is triggered in a broad range of widely realized experien-
tial conditions which result in the formation of theistic beliefs 
BtV ... ,Btn (where these theistic beliefs are of the form God created 
all this, God is present, etc.). 
[P2] For human persons in their post-lapsarian state, the sensus 
divinitatis, though functional, is subject to a range of malfunc-
tions so that it does not always yield theistic beliefs in accor-
dance with the original human cognitive design plan.s 
Although Beversluis agrees that Calvin holds [PI], he thinks that instead 
of [P2] Calvin maintains: 
[C2] For human persons in their post-lapsarian state, the sensus 
divinitatis is completely nonfunctional so that it does not result 
in the formation of theistic beliefs BtV ... ,Btn. 
and 
[C3] For human persons in their post-lapsarian state, theistic beliefs 
Bt1,. .. ,Btn are fomled only by divine agency through regeneration. 
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It follows from [C2] and [C3] that: 
[C4] For post-Iapsarian human persons, there is no natural knowl-
edge of God. 
II. Two Kinds of Natural Knowledge of God 
Do fallen human persons have a natural knowledge of God? The crux of 
the argument here is the meaning of the locution "knowledge of God." 
In the first part of Beversluis' paper, in which he presents his first cri-
tique of Plantinga, he assumes - like Plantinga - a true belief plus "some-
thing else" account of knowledge. Here it is propositional knowledge 
about God that is at issue, and Beversluis' main claim is that the sensus 
divinitatis is epistemically inefficacious since it does not produce theistic 
beliefs of the sort that Plantinga claims. Plantinga's error is a defective view 
of the noetic effects of sin, thinking that humans could naturally form the-
istic beliefs that they cannot apart from grace. Unless a person is given the 
gift of faith by grace, there is no knowledge of God (i.e., true belief plus 
something else) based on the revelation of God in nature. 
However, in the second part of his paper, Beversluis introduces a differ-
ent sense to the locution "knowledge of God." He says that the kind of 
"knowledge" which Calvin thinks is essential to the Christian life is not 
merely theoretical in nature (a knowledge that or about, so-called proposi-
tional knowledge) but a knowledge which is experiential or affective and 
impacts human life and action.6 
After quoting from Calvin's Institutes (1.2.1 and 1.5.9), Beversluis writes: 
Calvin is not interested in the bare assertion that "God exists" or 
"there is such a person as God." His concern is not with certain 
alleged "deliverances of reason" in the form of "properly basic" 
beliefs. For him, knowledge of God is not theoretical knowledge 
about God but a personal relationship to God which manifests itself in 
a life of obedience and which leads to piety and morally upright con-
duct which he regards as the fruit of true religion. Knowing God 
involves loving God. (RRO, pp. 198-199) 
According to Beversluis grace is a necessary precondition for this partic-
ular kind of "knowledge of God", call it the "experiential" knowledge of 
God, which includes a love of and obedience to God. This kind of knowl-
edge is not the same as the theoretical or propositional knowledge 
Beversluis discusses in the first part of his paper, and so the sense in which 
fallen humans cannot have a natural knowledge of God changes in the 
course of the paper. Although there is no logical inconsistency in denying 
a post-Iapsarian natural knowledge of God in Beversluis' two senses, I do 
not think that Beversluis has properly handled the distinction he draws. 
Moreover, 1 think that the failure to handle this distinction properly leads 
Beversluis into a rather significant contradiction in his paper. 
After explaining the distinction between a mere theoretical knowledge 
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of God and the affecting knowledge of God, Beversluis admits that fallen 
humans "already believe in God" (RRO, p. 199). He adds: "there are no 
atheists." Here Beversluis reconstructs what he takes to be Calvin's 
"Reformed" objection to natural theology: since everyone already believes 
in God, there is no point to constructing theistic arguments. And natural 
theology is concerned with theoretical not experiential knowledge of God. 
Beversluis takes these two points to be the essence of the original Reformed 
objection to natural theology, not a commitment to properly basic theistic 
beliefs as Plantinga holds. 
I find Beversluis' statements in the second part of his paper most per-
plexing given all he argued in the first part of his article. The great dichoto-
my in his first argument was between a theoretical knowledge about God 
construed as a deliverance of reason (Plantinga's Calvin) and the view that 
all such theoretical knowledge is achievable only by divine grace 
(Beversluis' Calvin).7 Much was made of the point that without grace fall-
en persons do not even have the capacity "to form the belief that God 
exists" when they look at the beauty and grandeur of nature. What could 
Beversluis possibly mean, then, when he asserts both (i) everyone already 
believes in God and (ii) no one can believe in God apart from a work of 
grace? If we assume (as Beversluis appears to) that grace is not given to 
everyone, then (ii) entails that some people do not believe in God. But this 
contradicts his later statements according to which people do hold certain 
propositions about the existence of God. Perhaps part of the problem here 
is that Beversluis does not unpack his crucial concession that people do 
believe in God. He does not explain the content of such beliefs. Are all such 
beliefs of fallen humans false beliefs, so that they do not constitute (theoret-
ical) knowledge? This seems implausible. Or are they true but lacking 
some other property necessary for knowledge? He develops no epistemo-
logical apparatus to clarify his claims. He is simply vague about how this 
"belief in God" present in every fallen person differs from the "belief in 
God" Plantinga is concerned with elucidating and which Beversluis asserts 
cannot be arrived at without grace. 
Ill. Calvin on Post-Lapsarian Natural Knowledge of God 
In response to Beversluis I would claim that Calvin does teach that fall-
en, and yes unregenerate, people do hold (some) true beliefs about God, 
where such beliefs are among the deliverances of reason.8 In this sense, 
then, fallen humans can and do have a natural knowledge of God apart 
from an internal work of the Spirit. Beversluis mentions Calvin's aware-
ness of Paul's statement in Romans: "the invisible things of God from the 
creation of the world are dearly seen, being understood by the things that 
are made" (Romans 1:20). But the suppressing of the truth in unrighteous-
ness that Paul goes on to develop certainly seems to presuppose that what 
God has revealed "is understood." 
Calvin comments: 
He [Paul] does not mention all the particulars which may be thought 
to belong to God; but he states, that we can arrive at the knowledge 
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of his eternal power and divinity; for he who is the framer of all 
things, must necessarily be without beginning and from himself. 
When we arrive at this point, the divinity becomes known to us, 
which cannot exist except accompanied with all the attributes of a 
God, since they are all included under that idea .... Yet let this differ-
ence be remembered, that the manifestation of God, by which he 
makes his glory known in his creation, is, with regard to the light 
itself, sufficiently clear; but that on account of our blindness it is not 
found to be sufficient. ... We conceive that there is a Deity; and then 
we conclude that he ought to be worshiped: but our reason here fails, 
because it cannot ascertain who or what sort of being God isYO 
In his Commentary Upon the Acts of the Apostles, Calvin relates the 
account of Paul and Barnabas who offered arguments for the providential 
care of God since "they take this principle, that in the order of nature there 
is a certain and evident manifestation of God."" Calvin does not disap-
prove. Presumably Beversluis would, for if this order in nature is seen only 
by faith, the Apostle was acting foolishly. Moreover, it is this "evident 
manifestation" which forms the basis of Paul's apologetic at Mars Hill. 
According to Calvin, Paul "showeth by natural arguments who and what 
God is,"'2 and since "he hath to deal with profane men, he draweth proofs 
from nature itself; for in vain should he have cited testimonies of 
Scripture."" Now although Calvin is careful to note in this context that 
there is a "true knowledge of God" which is a gift and comes by faith, this 
is carefully distinguished from a "general knowledge of God"14 which 
remains in fallen humans. Calvin says that by nature fallen humans are 
imbued with some sense of God: "aliquo Dei sensu imbuti sunt". Although 
unregenerate people entertain wrong ideas about God, or in some cases 
even deny his existence, Calvin insists that there is a natural knowledge of 
God in fallen humans. In his commentaries on both Romans and Acts 
Calvin says that the natural knowledge is "insufficient." But Calvin is clear 
about the nature of this "insufficiency." For one, it is only a knowledge of 
God as Creator, not as Redeemer. Secondly, since without grace fallen 
humans have confused ideas of God, Scripture helps us to understand 
properly who and what God is, thereby disabusing us of false notions 
about the Creator. Most importantly, man's natural knowledge is not 
salvific - does not include a love of and obedience to God. What Calvin 
calls a "true", "clear", or "pure" knowledge of God is both affective and 
effective. Man's natural knowledge of God is not. '5 
Calvin's position in the commentaries is consistent with what he says in 
the Institutes. In the Institutes Calvin distinguishes between a "pure and 
clear knowledge" of God (which has reference to both a right conception of 
what God is and affective knowledge) and "perceptions" or "convictions" 
that "there is some God" (1.3.3) or "some conception of God" 0.3.2) and 
that "he is their Maker" (1.3.1).16 When Calvin refers to the "primal and 
simple knowledge to which the very order of nature would have led us if 
Adam had remained upright" 0.2.1), he is referring to knowledge in the 
former sense. This knowledge certainly includes a propositional compo-
nent. Calvin says that even the few who deny that God exists, "from time 
98 Faith and Philosophy 
to time feel an inkling of what they desire not to believe" 0.3.2). Calvin 
seems to think of knowledge of God's existence in this sense as something 
like a "bare" knowledge of God, which carries with it some notion of God's 
nature. This is clearly propositional knowledge, as opposed to the more 
affective or experiential knowledge that is Calvin's main interest. The fail-
ure of this 'bare" knowledge is partly epistemic: people sometimes have 
false beliefs about God (though Calvin is careful not to assert that no one 
has any true beliefs about God). More importantly, the bare knowledge 
does not affect fallen humans as it ought. We are not moved to love and 
worship God. Beversluis has correctly located this failure of natural knowl-
edge. But Calvin most certainly does not deny that the sensus divinitatis is 
functional in fallen humans so that it produces no true theistic beliefs. 17 
There still remains what I am calling a propositional knowledge. This 
knowledge at least includes propositions of the form "there is some God," 
"God is one," "God is powerful," and "God is Creator of the world." In 
this sense, according to Calvin, fallen humans can and do have a natural 
knowledge of God. 
W. Theistic Knowledge and Accountability to God 
Beversluis rightly points out that for Calvin natural revelation has a post-
lapsarian function: leaving humans "without excuse" for their sins before 
God (RRO, p. 195). The original edition of the Institutues, being modeled on 
Luther's Catechism, introduced the topic of "knowledge of God" in the con-
text of an exposition of the law of God, thereby placing Calvin's epistemo-
logical discussion in a distinct moral and religious context. But what exactly 
is the connection between the implicit epistemological claims and the 
explicit issue of moral and/or religious accountability before God? It has 
been argued that fallen humans are responsible before God because there is 
an objectively clear revelation of God in the created order, but men fail to 
see this revelation of God as creator because, as fallen, they are noetically 
blind. Moreover, though our noetic blindness is a consequence of our fallen 
nature, we are nonetheless responsible for our fallen nature and so respon-
sible before God. This model would seem to provide Beversluis with a way 
of maintaining the post-Iapsarian relevance of natural revelation without 
affirming any post-Iapsarian natural knowledge. IS 
Beversluis might find some support for this claim as others have in the 
Institutes (1.5.14-15). In these chapters Calvin seems to base human 
accountability on the fact that God's revelation in creation is objectively 
clear and humans are blind to it because they have willingly chosen to 
smother the natural light God has given them. The manifestation of God in 
creation renders men inexcusable 0.5.14) and we are prevented from 
acquiring by natural ability a pure and clear knowledge of God, but "all 
excuse is cut off because the fault of dullness is within us" (1.5.15). Yet 
though elsewhere Calvin grounds the noetic effects of sin in the transmis-
sion of a sinful nature inherited from Adam (so that we are all born with 
noetic defects of some sort), Calvin here emphasizes noetic corruption as 
caused by acts of personal sin. Notice, though, that the natural revelation 
in creation strikes "some sparks" but "their fuller light" is what is smoth-
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ered by perverted human will. Consequently, we are not led on "the right 
path.// Calvin is concerned with the willful corruption of the "seed of the 
knowledge of God" so that it fails to bear "proper fruit." The discussion of 
the (inherited and acquired) noetic effects of sin in the Institutes is compati-
ble with some bare knowledge of God. 
This conclusion is further substantiated by Calvin's exposition of 
Romans 1:18-23, which inspired and forms the background to the discus-
sion in the Institutes. In his 1540 Commentary on Romans Calvin explicitly 
asserts that it is a kllow/edge of God possessed by fallen human persons 
which renders them inexcusable.19 After affirming the majesty of God set 
forth in the created order, Calvin makes three claims: (i) the evidence of 
God's existence in creation is sufficiently clear in itself, (ii) it is rendered 
obscure [not eradicated] by human blindness, and (iii) human blindness 
does not preclude our having some knowledge of God in our fallen state. 
Calvin writes: "We are not so blind that we can plead our ignorance as an 
excuse for our perverseness. We conceive that there is a Deity; and then we 
conclude, that whoever he may be, he ought to be worshipped .... but this 
knowledge which avails only to take away excuse, differs greatly from that 
which brings salvation .... "20 Calvin's interest here is to affirm some post-
lapsarian knowledge of God as a basis for accountability to God, while at 
the same time denying the completeness or purity of this knowledge, for 
he says that it is only by the light of Scripture and faith that we can obtain 
the knowledge of "who or what sort of being God is.// 
Calvin apparently has a complex theory of moral and religious account-
ability. There are both positive and negative grounds of inexcusability. We 
are born with original sin derived from Adam, and this entails inherited 
noetic effects of sin. In this context we are without excuse when we fail to 
worship God because, despite the inherited noetic effects of sin, we know 
at least this much: there is a Creator God and He ought to be worshipped.21 
But there are also acquired noetic effects of sin, and as a consequence we 
are also without excuse if we lack a clear knowledge of God, because we 
willingly corrupt our natural knowledge of God. 
Having said this I hasten to add that the presence of some natural 
knowledge of God in fallen, unregenerate people is compatible with their 
not acknowledging the existence of God or their claiming not to believe or 
know that God exists. Self-deception may be regarded as another noetic 
effect of sin. Calvin certai.nly holds that humans rebel against the light God 
has offered them in nature. But this rebellion, supression of truth in 
unrighteousness, and corruption of the clear knowledge of God are all 
compatible with a set of true beliefs and stock of natural knowledge of 
God.22 Persons may know that God exists, even if they choose to live their 
life without reference to him. Beversluis comes close to seeing this point 
when he says that all people believe in God but not all acknowledge their 
beliefs. What Beversluis should have argued is that, though there are nat-
ural theistic beliefs produced by a functioning sensus divinitatis, we must 
recognize that this faculty (or related ones) is subject to various malfunc-
tions that entail the production of a mixture of true and false theistic 
beliefs, as well as a refusal to acknowledge one's theistic beliefs.23 But this 
way of looking at matters is entirely compatible with what Plantinga says 
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about the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga's examples of properly basic theistic 
beliefs are a legitimate elaboration of the propositional content Calvin 
thinks is epistemically accessible for fallen humans by natural reason 
alone, even though such knowledge is not what Calvin thinks of as a 
"true" or "pure" knowledge of God. 
v. Conclusion 
Plantinga's epistemological account of the sensus divinitatis is a rigorous 
epistemological unpacking of Calvin's empirical claim that people do 
believe in God and that this belief is universally distributed. Beversluis 
fails to see that this point is similar to what he himself concedes in the sec-
ond part of the article, thereby rendering his critical account of Plantinga in 
the first part of the article fundamentally wrong-headed. Although Calvin 
may not have been interested in epistemological questions, epistemological 
commitments are implicit in the text. Moreover, Beversluis' identification 
of normativity with "justification" (being within one's intellectual rights) 
overlooks a second kind of normativity which is the focus of Plantinga's 
more recent work: the normativity of proper function (how something 
should function when it is functioning in accordance with a design plan of 
some sort). Perhaps Calvin was not concerned with matters of rationality 
construed as "intellectual rights." Perhaps such a thing never entered his 
head. But Calvin is certainly committed to the view that we are created in 
the image of God and thus created with a theistic purpose. This creative act 
and theistic purpose is revealed everywhere in our life. Plantinga's posi-
tion is that it is revealed in our cognitive life as well. Maybe this is not the 
most important consequence of being created in the image of God, but it is 
hardly irrelevant. When human beings are functioning properly (as God 
designed them) they do in fact form various theistic beliefs. We can call this 
a rationality of proper function. Because of sin, the sensus divinitatis is sub-
ject to various malfunctions. People do not always form theistic belief(s), 
sometimes they do not form theistic belief(s) with the degree of firmness 
which is specified by God's design plan, and - as Calvin points out -
humans sometimes form false beliefs about God. All of this seems to me to 
be a legitimate development and explanation of Calvin's implicit episte-
mology based on a rigorous theistic metaphysics.24 
Beversluis has in typical Barthian fashion confused two distinct issues: 
the epistemic efficacy and the behavioral efficacy of knowledge of God. Better 
yet, he has confused the proper and pure knowledge of God (with its affec-
tive and moral element) with what lies within the grasp of fallen natural 
reason at the theoretical level. As far as I can see, Plantinga nowhere says 
that the kind of knowledge he is concerned with elucidating vis-a-vis the 
sensus divinitatis has the behavioral efficacy which Beversluis thinks Calvin 
associates with the knowledge of God. So even if this is Calvin's objection 
to natural theology, it is not clear that Plantinga has underestimated the 
noetic effects of sin. Plantinga may have a different interest from Calvin, 
but there is no significant discontinuity between them regarding the extent 
of the noetic effects of sin. If we understand by "knowledge" a purely 
"epistemic" category, loosely corresponding to true belief plus "something 
CALVIN, PLANTINGA, NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 101 
else" (justification, warrant, etc), I do not see that Plantinga is defective at 
all. He has not to any significant degree minimized the noetic effects of sin. 
Beversluis' two arguments involve a crucial switch in the meaning of the 
locution "knowledge of God". The result is a logical disconnectedness 
between his arguments, and a loss of internal coherence within the paper 
as a whole. When he denies that Calvin holds that there is a natural knowl-
edge of God for fallen humans, either he is using that locution as he does 
on pages 198-9 (to refer to affective knowledge) or he is using it as 
Plantinga does. If he means the former, then his comments are inapplicable 
to Plantinga's position, as the two are talking about two different things. If, 
on the other hand, Beversluis uses knowledge as Plantinga is using the 
term, then what Beversluis says is not consistent with either Calvin or, as I 
see it, Beversluis' own claims in the second part of his article. So perhaps 
there are two Reformed objections to natural theology (I suspect there are 
more than that). One thing is clear, the Barthian assessment of Calvin still 
falters in that it fails to distinguish the different ways Calvin himself uses 
the word "knowledge," and hence fails to capture the ways in which fallen 
humans do and do not have a natural knowledge of God.25 
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NOTES 
1. All references to this article will hereafter be cited parenthetically in the 
text with the abbreviation, RRO. 
2. Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, ed. 
Plantinga and WoIterstorff (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 
1983), pp. 65-67. 
3. Alvin Plantinga, "The Prospects for Natural Theology" in Philosophical 
Perspectives,S, 1991, pp. 303-310. See also his forthcoming Warranted Christian 
Belief, chapter 8. 
4. It is not clear whether Beversluis intends "knowledge of God" here to 
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